By Randeep Purewall

In April 1998, just after India conducted its nuclear tests, the then Minister of Defence, George Fernandes referred to China as India’s “potential threat number one.” Years earlier in a personal letter, Nehru wrote of China as India’s “foe or adversary for a considerable time to come.” Nehru exhorted India to concentrate on buildings its defence “to meet the Chinese menace.”

Alarm bells also rang in a recent article in the Times of India over discussions between Beijing and Rangoon on allowing Chinese navy access to Burmese ports and the Bay of Bengal.

Whereas Indian theories of a China “threat” focus more on Chinese actions (including China’s building a road in Aksai Chin, the invasion of northern India, China’s coziness with Pakistan etc.), the Indian obsession with China (including the GDP growth rate and HDI comparisons), has more to do with factors internal to India, that is with India’s historical and national conditioning.

Nation-states, perceive one another in much the same way as persons perceive (or misperceive) one another. Just as it is difficult for an individual to sometimes observe something objectively, free from ones biases, experiences or beliefs, so too can it be difficult for nation-states to observe something “objectively” in a way that is free from historical experience, nationalist ideology or considerations of realpolitik.  

India’s perception of China is also influenced by India’s own self-perception as a country destined for greatness. With the birth of the idea of a united India, and the rediscovery of ancient Indian learning under the British, many Indian nationalists, including Nehru in his “The Discovery of India,” became convinced that India had once been “great” and would be great again. The idea of India’s greatness was lavishly displayed at the First Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March 1947. It also spawned the “Nehruvian” school of Indian foreign policy thinking, committed to a vision of India as a key player in Asia and the world.  And of course, it was shiningly proclaimed by the BJP in the 2003 reelection campaign after the country’s GDP received a boost from a charitable monsoon.

The China “threat” to India stems from India’s perception that China is challenges, and may even appropriate, India’s historic due as the great power of Asia. Not only can China lay claim to one of the most successfully and influential of world civilizations, but it shares India’s sense of being historically destined for great power status. Unlike India which is seen as a potential or emerging power, China is seen by many as a power that is already arriving whether through its share of world trade, its diplomatic and political influence through the United Nations, and the “soft power” challenge of the Chinese model of development. For India, Chinese actions (whether the 1962 war, relations with Pakistan, or competition for resources in Asia) acquire a new gloss as part and parcel of a greater race for preeminence in Asia, and internationally.

So the China threat to India is real and visible, unless of course we challenge the basic beliefs which affect India’s perception that is the idea of India’s “greatness.” In challenging and doing away with those beliefs, India may perceive China in a way that is less coloured by biases of national ideology. By taking perception seriously, one can also look at why Pakistan perceives India a particular way, or why Israel looks at the Palestinian authority in a particular light, and how any such perception or misperception can be overcome by first discrediting  core beliefs involving inflated notions of national self, mythological histories, and shining destinies.